The conflicts in Liberia, Eastern DRC and Côte d'Ivoire can be "read" as "wars of modernity" as they are concerned with the composition of their respective polities: who is a citizen and who is not. However, these contemporary conflicts are deeply embedded in a long history of violence: integral to this history is the issue of land. Citizenship in itself does not secure access to land, but at the very least it allows those with this status a legitimate entry to the competition for land. There is therefore a direct link between contested citizenship and land rights issues. Drawing on fieldwork material from the above-mentioned countries, this article will show how localised identity narratives under certain circumstances destroy as well as reformulate national identities, and that insight from ethnographic work on autochthonic issues can help us understand conflicts in a broad range of African countries.
Questions concerning autochthony in the form of the politics of place, belonging, identity and contested citizenship are currently among the most crucial and controversial in African politics. As Jackson (2007: 481) observes, the laws regulating citizenship and nationality have become increasingly restrictive in a number of countries in the last couple of decades, particularly with regard to minority and/or immigrant identity groups.
The outcome is violent "nationalist" discourses causing violence and even civil war in countries as diverse as Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia.
As the term "autochthony" is only part of the daily language in two of these countries (i.e. Côte d'Ivoire and DRC), it may look like these cases do not have that much in common. However, these cases illuminate how African countries that differ significantly with regard to important dimensions such as size (geography and population), time of independence (Liberia 1848; DRC and Côte d'Ivoire 1960), colonial history, and sectors of economic importance (agriculture or mining) produce a similar violent local discourse that undermines these states, at least with regard to their inherent nationbuilding projects.
The very nature of these discourses tends to lean towards exclusion rather than inclusion, in essence leading to polarisation and fragmentation rather than producing the images of unity needed to maintain and facilitate a national consciousness. Thus, creating a concern with the composition of the polity in which the central question revolves around who is a citizen and who is not, locking the citizenship questions into the exclusionist language of autochthony. The conflicts resulting from this debate are modern "wars", but also deeply embedded in a long history of violence: integral to this history is the issue of land.
"Autochthony" literally means "emerging from the soil", and thus implies local forms of belonging as it refers to someone with a supposedly indisputable historical link to a particular territory (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005) . However, for all practical purposes autochthony is just a word for a certain way of framing political debates. Once we acknowledge this we also become aware of striking similarities; commonalities that best can be described as "tales of origin as political cleavage": a political conflict that becomes institutionalised in both social practice and the discursive structure on which this practice is based. Such narratives argue that certain groups have certain inalienable rights to land, to property, to employment or to social benefits that other groups should not necessarily have. Where land (or employment and other rights and benefits for that matter) is perceived as scarce, one important asset may be the ability to stake your claim from the position of being autochthonous, e.g. as the "son of the soil", whereas your counterpart is presented as a "newcomer"; as an "immigrant". In such cases, being recognised as the true citizens of the political unit in question (i.e. country, region, city or village) is of primary importance because although "citizenship does not entitle you to resources, it entitles you to enter the struggle for resources" (Mamdani 2002: 505) .
Thus, the protection of rights is argued through tales of origin in the form of story-telling about a collective "we". This unit can be anything from the nuclear family to the lineage, the community, the ethnic group or several ethnic groups faced with a perceived stranger, an other, an intruder, an enemy: somebody threatening certain rights seen as the heritage of the "sons of the soil".
Drawing upon fieldwork material from Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo and Liberia, 1 the article 2 will show how localised identity narratives under certain circumstances can destroy as well as re-formulate national identities. The power as well as the contradiction of these discourses is that they underwrite as well as over-rule other identities. The discourses underlying these conflicts are not only a manifest illustration of a crisis of modernity, but also represent struggles deeply entrenched in history. Their origins can be traced to pre-colonial practices as well as to ideas about the politics of place embedded in the colonial project.
Land and Belonging: "Wars of Modernity?"
Most African countries are still agricultural economies, and in Africa land issues have increasingly become vulnerable to the politics of identity and belonging (see Hagberg 2004; Kuba and Lentz 2006) . Land is not only a scarce commodity in certain areas, it is also the most essential element of rural life. Land is everything as belonging to the land guarantees the rights of present as well as future generations. In contrast, citizenship does not in itself secure the right to land, it merely allows those who are citizens to enter the political economy of land and land rights questions. Thus, there is a direct link between contested citizenship and land rights. "Land is a special substance; it is not increasable, non-renewable, and central to both material livelihood and the politics of belonging" (Lentz 2006: 30) . It must therefore also be protected at all costs. Viewed at a glance, the areas of concern in this article may seem sparsely populated and land therefore abundant, but this is not the case. This is amply illustrated by the case of Lofa County in Liberia, which we will return to in more detail later in the article. Here, the cultivation of upland rice is the most important agricultural product for both the Loma and the Mandingo. Rice is their staple food and the mode of production is swidden agriculture, in which fallow periods vary from four to twelve years depending on factors such as population density, land availability and soil fertility, suggesting that each household needs access to large areas of land (see also Højbjerg 2007) .
The conflicting claims concerning citizenship and land rights are not a novelty created by a "new war", but an enduring part of the history of these areas that is better seen along the lines of la langue durée than as a direct outcome of a crisis of modernity (see Braudel 1994) . The conflicts in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Eastern Congo have a long and complicated history that became ever more manifest with the establishment of the African state system and during the post-colonial crisis which is taking place amidst an externally imposed "recent drive towards political and economic liberalisation [that] has engendered a rapid intensification of struggles over belonging, an obsession with autochtonie and ever more violent forms of exclusion of socalled "strangers", even when they are citizens of the same country" (Geschiere 2004: 237) . In some places, this process undermined the whole notion of national citizenship or radically changed its definition (see Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000) . With a few notable exceptions -first and foremost Somalia -most African countries are multi-ethnic societies. In the pre-colonial era, citizenship -if one meaningfully can speak of such -was a relatively fluid political practice. The colonial imposition of citizenship, which essentially tied each individual to a specific territorially-bounded polity, was therefore an event of revolutionary magnitude. After independence citizenship laws increased in importance, as the new African states had to permanently define who legitimately lived within the borders of their territory and who did not. This creation of "foreigners" led to riots in many places on the continent (in Côte d'Ivoire as early as in the 1950s; see Crook 1997) . What had been latent suddenly became manifest.
In Liberia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire nationalist "projects" were imagined through the presidencies of Tubman, Mobutu and Houphouët-Boigny -as founding fathers they projected and presented ideas about their nations as collective units with common purpose, identity and narrative. 3 However, with hindsight these projects seem as shallow as their democratic credentials as none of them outlasted their founding fathers. In the aftermath of their reigns, the Liberian, Ivorian and Congolese populations have instead increasingly questioned and struggled over issues of belonging and the composition of the national polity.
Liberia -War in Lofa County
During the period from 1980 to 2003 Liberia became synonymous with war, chaos and destruction. Fragmented by different militias that seemingly fought each other for no better reason than plunder and theft, the country was presented as another primary example of the "new war" thesis (see Kaldor 2001) . There is little doubt that economic motives were important for the war and the establishment of the militias involved. However, militia formation was also a consequence of issues and tensions deeply entrenched in Liberian history. The Liberian conflict was not just one war. It was a series of local conflicts tangled up in each other, as Charles Taylor's rebellion against Samuel Doe's dictatorship pushed the Liberian state over the edge and into the abyss. This "nationalisation" of local conflict created a "logic of war" that dramatically affected the course of the war, the decision making of the individuals involved, and the subsequent militia formation (see Bøås and Hatløy 2008) . This situation is not unique to the Liberian war, but is an important aspect of all the cases discussed in this article.
The Liberian war was therefore a national conflict constituted by a series of local conflicts. This is vividly illustrated by the conflict between the Loma and the Mandingo in Lofa County. Taylor's ability to tap into preexisting conflicts, in Lofa and elsewhere in Liberia, triggered the war. However, the very same conflicts were also the combined outcome of conflict patterns preceding the Americo-Liberians and the administrative practices of their state. In fact, revisiting the Liberian civil war through the lenses of autochthony, the argument can be made that viewed in this manner, the war-lords, the grand plans, the elites and the international connections become less important and what we are left with is the intertwining of a series of local conflicts into a larger pattern: a zone of violent conflict that evolves and develops as local communities -dazzled and confused by the events unfolding in their midst -try to protect what they believe belongs to them. This process is illustrated by the established relation of domination between the Loma and the Mandingo that formally assigns first comer status and control of land rights to the Loma. The outcome has been an unstable system of political subordination that the Mandingo often could escape from as they channelled economic power through their trade networks. In this sense, the local form of the Liberian civil war was the latest manifestation of a long history of co-operation but also prolonged spells of conflict between these two communities. The conflicting claims concerning citizenship and land rights are therefore an enduring part of the history of this area that is better seen along the lines of la longue durée, as argued above.
Lofa is the northernmost Liberian county, and because it is a relatively isolated hinterland area, the political affairs of Lofa have always been a world apart from Monrovia. Nonetheless, the county was swiftly and firmly integrated into the Liberian civil war. This was partly due to the dynamics of the war itself, but also a consequence of pre-existing tensions between the Loma -who consider themselves autochthonous to this area -and the Mandingo, who are generally seen as latecomers and immigrants. They are not considered proper Liberians, but as a people of foreign origin (Bøås 2005) . The Mandingo are viewed as "foreigners" originating from Guinea -not real Liberians. Thus, their very right to citizenship is often questioned when a conflict occurs between the people of Mandingo origin and representatives of other ethnic groups (Konneh 1996) .
As a consequence, the relationship between the Loma and Mandingo in Lofa has been tense and hostile, particularly since the beginning of the civil war in 1990. The Mandingo accuse the Loma of supporting Taylor's forces when they reached this part of Liberia in the autumn of 1990, whereas the Loma believe that the attacks in 1992 on their towns by the mainly Mandingo militia, the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), were unjustified and mainly carried out to take their land and steal their belongings. Similarly, when the Liberians United for Democracy and Reconciliation (LURD) militia crossed over the border from Guinea in 1998-99, the Loma claimed that LURD forces -also a Mandingo dominated movement -attacked their villages indiscriminately. The war and Taylor's ability to tap into these sentiments intensified the conflict, but did not create it. The historical relationship between the Loma and Mandingo and their co-operation as well as conflict rests on a hierarchical stratification of rights based on the "stranger-father" institution. When the Mandingo first arrived in Lofa, it was most often as individual traders conducting long-distance commerce between the forest areas of Liberia and the savannah regions further inland. They brought with them both much needed goods as well as important skills such as blacksmithing. In many ways, the first Mandingo settlers must have had access to larger economic resources than the original Loma inhabitants. However, in order to settle permanently and gain access to land, the Mandingo had to enter into subordinate relationships through the "stranger-father" institution. In basic terms, this means that a "stranger" who seeks settlement in a village or community needs to be adopted by an autochthonous father: the "stranger" must have a "father" -a figure of authority that takes upon himself the responsibility to make certain that the "stranger" behaves in accordance with the rules and regulations of the community. Thus, when a Mandingo first moved into a Loma village, he also entered into a subordinate position with a "strangerfather"; locking him and his lineage forever into a subordinate political position with regard to decisions about land and land use. The product of this interaction was a relatively fixed notion of political alignment in local everyday politics, creating a hierarchical political system that was supposed to regulate titles to land.
Everybody who is allowed to stay in a village is allocated some land for food production (albeit the size of the plots and their number may vary a lot), but only those defined as autochthonous or "sons of the soil" were originally allowed to cultivate so-called life crops (e.g. tree crops such as rubber, cocoa, coffee, banana etc.) since anyone who cultivates tree crops also embeds oneself in the soil and makes a permanent connection to it. In order to be considered autochthonous, it is necessary to be the first comer, although this alone is not a sufficient condition: one must also transform the landscape permanently from wilderness to a field of one's livelihood. This can only be achieved by planting tree-crops.
Part of the "bad-blood" between the Loma and the Mandingo that Taylor's forces so cunningly used to their advantage during the war, was that some Mandingo either had taken or been given the right to cultivate life and former Doe official, ULIMO first fought in south-eastern Sierra Leone before it battled its way back to Liberia and Lofa County. LURD was established in Guinea was a successor to the Mandingo faction in ULIMO just after Taylor's victory in the 1997 elections. See Ellis (1998) ; Gberie (2005) ; Reno (2007) ; and Bøås and Hatløy (2008) . crops through their position as providers of rural credit in towns were they constituted a minority. Even if the Mandingo were politically marginalised through the "stranger-father" institution, they represented economic muscle through their access to Mandingo trade networks. As a consequence, in the immediate pre-war situation in Lofa the local Loma discourse centred on how the Mandingo had upset the balance and disturbed certain rights seen as inalienable. Thus, when the war came to Lofa, parts of the autochthonous population used it, as a pretext to reclaim what they believed was their natural born right.
Thus, the current conflict has a history that precedes the Liberian state and the making of the modern state system in West Africa. However, we must also recognise how the "rules of engagement" changed with the imposition of modern statehood that linked citizenship to a specific territoriallydefined politics of place (see also Bøås 2009 ). The background for much of the turmoil in Eastern Congo and Côte d'Ivoire are remarkably similar. These conflicts are by and large agrarian wars that precede the modern state system, but are accentuated by the crisis of modernity in post-colonial Africa.
Eastern Congo: Land Rights, Identity and Conflict in North Kivu
The crisis in Eastern Congo is often presented as an "international conspiracy" and a modern "resource war", i.e. being merely about the pillage and plunder of coltan and cassiterite (see Samset 2002; Braeckman 2003) . However, the conflict in North Kivu is deeply entrenched in history as well. And its underlying causes are located in the complex web of uncertainties concerning citizenship and land rights that have become an integral part of peoples" livelihoods (Bøås 2008) .
The province of North Kivu is located on the very boundary between the more centralised kingdoms of Rwanda and Uganda and the more fluid political systems of Central Africa's forest regions. It is a place of mighty mountains, active volcanoes, dense forests and fertile soil, but also of intense population pressure (see also Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005) . It is a meeting place and melting pot, but also an area that has repeatedly tasted the bitter fruit of conflict, most often between groups claiming the status of autochthony and those defined as "strangers": migrants supposedly without the same level of attachment to a mythological native land.
Most of the migration has traditionally come from the east. Although many migrated from Rwanda during colonial times, e.g. after 1885, the presence of the Banyarwanda reaches back to pre-colonial times (Lemarchand 2006; Vansina 2004) . The Banyarwanda are, in the simplest terms, the people who speak the Kinyarwanda language. Once these people or their ancestors may have lived in what is currently known as Rwanda, but through a series of migratory waves they currently dwell in DRC as well as Uganda and Tanzania. This migration took place through the centuries, and the length of residence and its history have shaped these communities. It is therefore not possible to talk about the Banyarwanda of North Kivu as a homogenous group. They include people of Hutu as well as Tutsi origin.
What these people have in common, however, is contested citizenship status and thereby also insecurity concerning their right to land, to vote and to stand for election. According to the Congolese Constitution of 1964 there exists only one Congolese nationality: "it is granted, beginning from the date of 30 June 1960 to all persons having now, or at some point in the past, as one of their ancestors a member of a tribe or the part of a tribe established on the territory of Congo before the 18th of October 1908" (Jackson 2006: 104) . Thus, the Banyarwanda could claim Congolese citizenship on the basis of ancestors being native to the DRC as of 18 October 1908. Those falling into this category could claim ancestral land along with other autochthonous groups in North Kivu. However, as the immigration and settlement of this group had taken place at different times and for several reasons, only a few qualified as undisputable citizens. This changed in 1972 when the Director of the Office of the President, Barthélemy Bisengimana, a Congolese Tutsi and Mobutu crony, masterminded a new citizenship law. The new law bestowed Congolese citizenship to all migrants living in the Congo prior to 1950. This gave a number of Banyarwanda political and economic rights that they had previously not enjoyed -suddenly they could vote, stand for election, and, not least, buy land (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005) .
However, this changed again in 1981 when Anzuluni Bembe, another Mobutu strongman and an autochthonous Babembe from South Kivu convinced the Legislative Council to reopen the nationality question. With a single stroke of the pen the 1972 law was repealed and a new law formulated that set the qualifying date back to the Berlin conference (e.g. 1 August, 1885). This effectively disqualified almost all the Banyarwanda. Some claimed that ancestors had arrived in North Kivu as long ago as the sixteenth century when this area constituted the western frontier of the powerful Nyiginya kingdom (see Vansina 2004 ), but it is almost impossible to prove that this was the case (Lemarchand 2006) . The 1981 law was never implemented, but it still provided the institutional basis for increased discrimination against the Banyarwanda, and the issue resurfaced again in the National Conference in 1991. The Banyarwanda had hoped that this conference would settle the citizenship issue, but instead the delegations that represented their interests were refused admission to the conference. In North Kivu this spilled over into interethnic skirmishes that exploded in anti-Banyarwanda violence in 1993 when armed youth groups of Nande, Hunde and Nyanga origin attacked Banyarwanda communities. The refugee flows that followed the Rwanda genocide further increased the tension because land became even scarcer, and the same was the case for the civil war that followed (Raeymaekers 2007).
The consequence was that the importance of confirming belonging to an area by ancestral connection to the land increased even further. The 2005 Constitution is a step in the right direction as it dates ancestral connections to Congolese soil to the time of independence and not to 1885 or 1908. However, as nationality is still tied to membership in a community dwelling on Congolese soil at the eve of independence, and since some of these also include people who arrived later, the door to uncertainty and manipulation of the citizenship question, and thereby to new conflict is not closed. The results of a field survey carried out in 2006 illustrates this point as it showed that only people of Banyarwanda origin found it necessary to locate their right to land back more than one generation. This may sound strange, but the reason is obvious. For people of Hunde, Nande or Nyanga decent, this is not important, as their tales of origin are not questioned. Nobody claims that they are not proper Congolese citizens, whereas despite the 2005 Constitution, the people of Banyarwanda origin still constantly have to argue their claim to Congolese citizenship and thereby to land (see Bøås 2008) .
Local resistance and the formation of militias is not a new phenomenon in North Kivu. In this part of Congo, there is a strong tradition of local resistance against any form of foreign control of land. Often based on elements of traditional beliefs, local tribal militias have mobilised parts of the population in order to defend the traditional order of control of the land.
The current history of the Mayi-Mayi illuminates this point. In its contemporary form it was started in North Kivu in 1992 by marginalised youth and educational dropouts. These initial Mayi-Mayi groups were based in the central areas of Masisi and Walikale, where they participated in the so-called interethnic war brought about by autochthonous Hunde and Nyanga communities who attempted to displace the Banyarwanda from these areas before local elections were about to take place. The Hunde and Nyanga communities feared that the Banyarwanda would become too influential due to their sheer numerical strength and that this would enable them to continue to keep land for which they no longer paid tribute for cultivating to Hunde and Nyanga chiefs (see ICG 2003) .
However, even if the Mayi-Mayi as a social phenomenon are embedded in traditional practices and local historical contexts, their relationship to traditional structures of authority is ambiguous at best. There is often intimate contact between the two, but traditional chiefs are not in total control of them as the formation of these militias in North Kivu also offered the young men the possibility to challenge age-based authority. This is not unique, but very similar to what happened in Côte d'Ivoire. In Liberia, young men also utilised their ability to use force to resist elders and the gerontocracy they represented, and at least parts of the violence around election day in Kenya can be read along similar lines (see, for example Kagwanja 2005) .
It is in this process that we not only see how violence leads to a shift in influence to the advantage of those able to master it, but also what kind of slippery relationships can emerge, and how the discourses they draw on underwrite as well as over-rule other identities. In North Kivu, several MayiMayi leaders have formed ad hoc alliances with Hutu rebels from Rwanda, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Some of these alliances were clearly -at least initially -based on calculations that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"; for example, their common goal is to fight perceived Tutsi rule and influence. But some of these relationships are also constructed on shared experiences of enclave-formation as armed social units try to differentiate themselves from the social structures of the world by offering an alternative to the existing social and political order (or lack of it). This seems particularly to be the case of the Mayi-Mayi -FDLR relationships that developed between the units operating in Virunga Park. The relative isolation of the groups from other communities may have forced them into an initial co-habitation that may have been purely practical at first, before later becoming cemented on shared narratives of marginalisation, neglect, and nostalgia for a past that seemed beyond redemption (Bøås 2008) . 5 Côte d'Ivoire -a Rural Conflict?
Similar controversies concerning citizenship and land rights issues are also centre stage of the Ivorian conflict. As previously noted, in Côte d'Ivoire these issues already surfaced in riots in the 1950s (see Crook 1997) . From 1960 to 1993, the country was under the firm rule of Felix Houphouët-Boigny who used the spoils of the export crop economy to tie local elites to his regime. Until the late 1980s this system of inclusive patrimonialism worked remarkably well. The country was seen as a haven of political and economic stability in an unruly region. However, contradictions, tensions 5 This observation is based on field research in the area and, in particular, in-depth interviews in 2006 in towns and villages along the road from Rutshuru to the border post at Ishasa. See also Richards (2005) and Bøås and Dunn (2007) for similar arguments about the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda.
and serious economic as well as political problems were simmering under the surface. Issues concerning citizenship and land rights play an important part in this history. The first thing we must recognise in this history is the importance of cocoa. It was the first source of indigenous wealth in the country and still remains the most important one. It is the backbone of the economy, and both the economic miracle and the latter recession that Côte d'Ivoire experienced are closely related to cocoa production. 6 The contemporary political economic and geographical stratification of cocoa production in Côte d'Ivoire is the outcome of a transformation in two steps: labour migration from the north to the cocoa-producing areas of the south, in combination with a relocation of production from southeast to southwest. The consequence is that land issues in southern Côte d'Ivoire are structured by an autochthon-migrant dichotomy. Here, the smallholder cocoa economy initially expanded in areas of low population density. Thus, in order to expand production migrant workers were needed. These workers came from the northern parts of Côte d'Ivoire, but also from neighbouring Burkina Faso and Mali. They came to work, but also in search of free land to establish their own farms.
These autochthon-migrant relations were institutionalised through what in Côte d'Ivoire is known as the tutorat. This informal rural institution establishes a bond of patronage between the autochthon and the migrant, to whom land rights are extended on the basis of the principle of a moral economy: any individual has a right to a piece of land necessary for his subsistence. Autochthons can therefore not deny land to a "good stranger", e.g. one who accepts the duties given to him by the local community and respects the prevailing socio-economic order. As an institution, the tutorat therefore regulates both the transfer of land rights as well as the incorporation of the migrant into the local community. The migrant, however, also owes the tuteur gratitude (that is transferred to his heirs), expressed through gifts, labour and money. These gifts or payments do not conclude the agreement on land rights, but rather perpetuate it -in principle, it is never ending (Colin, Kaoumé and Soro 2007) .
In the first decades after the introduction of cocoa, the relationship between migrants and the autochthons in the cocoa-producing regions were cordial. Land was abundant and most migrants were able to carve out a relatively good living from their involvement in cocoa production. However, as shown by Ruf (2001: 293-294) , land rights issues evolve around the growth 6 Côte d'Ivoire is the world's largest producer of cocoa: the country accounts for almost 40 percent of global cocoa production, 56 percent of cultivated land is utilised for cocoa production on as many as 500,000 small farms. See also Global Witness (2007) .
cycle of the cocoa plantation. "Most booms can be interpreted as situations were local ethnic groups who control land, or at least have a moral claim to it, meet up with migrants, who initially bring and control labour. In this meeting, migrants are often the winners, at least initially, when labour is scarce. Some 20 to 25 years later when replanting becomes necessary, land can become scarce, and if relocation of production is not possible one may witness increased conflict between migrants and the autochthons.
In the central and western regions of Côte d'Ivoire, open land access and extreme labour mobility pushed the cocoa frontier westward, creating ethnically heterogeneous villages across most of the Ivorian south as hardwood forests were cleared to make room for small farms. Already in the 1920s, migrant farmers had received access to forest land from autochthon Bété, Dida and Gouro groups and began to invest in export crop production. The period from 1946 to 1960 was therefore marked by an even larger inflow of "migrants" into this area. In the 1950s, this began to be perceived as a Baoulé invasion (see Chappel 1989) . In what became known as the policy of mise en valeur the government of Houphouët-Boigny granted land user rights to anybody who put idle land to use. This created a whole spectrum of unsolved questions concerning user rights vs. lineage-based claims to land that would later come back to haunt Côte d'Ivoire when land became scarce and the economy went into recession.
Thus, in less than a decade after independence the Bété, Dida and Gouro found themselves in the process of becoming a minority in their original homeland, leading to a situation in which the autochthonous Bété rallying around Laurent Gbagbo and his party, Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) started calling for a "second war of liberation" (see also Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007) . This was fuelled by the simple fact that the dynamic relocation of production had met its last frontier. The process could no longer recreate itself, as there was almost no free land left for the establishment of new farms. The integrative capacity of the forest belt is therefore rapidly diminishing and it can no longer sustain the traditional labour migration from the north to the south. In this situation, autochthons are contesting past land rights transfers under the tutorat institution in order to establish a new land fee or even have their land back.
Land rights issues are therefore an integral element in the Ivorian crisis, and the post-Houphouët era marks as Collin, Kouamé and Soro (2007: 35) note "the return of autochthony in the guise of ivoirité". This is vividly illustrated in the 1998 land law that excludes not only foreigners from land ownership, but also the possibility of excluding the Ivorian Baoulé and Dioula and other northern groups from land and land registration in the southern cocoa producing areas, as the law uses autochthony as the source of legiti-mate entitlement. Land, land rights questions and contested citizenship issues are therefore burning issues in Côte d'Ivoire just as they are in Liberia and in Eastern Congo.
The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is urban as well as rural, but as a war of identification (see Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007) it swiftly became particularly tense in the south-western part of the country where the majority of the country's cocoa is produced. When the Ivorian economy entered into a state of seemingly permanent crisis in the 1980s, competition for land and cocoa revenue increased. This was fuelled by the high rates of urban unemployment that sent many young men back to their villages in the southwest. Here, the migrants became the scapegoats for the financial difficulties that these returnees also encountered in their home districts, and in the new land law of 1998, they found the pretext to deprive people they considered migrants from the land. Already in 1999, more than 15,000 Burkinabe and Ivorians from the north left the southwest after bloody clashes around the town of Tabou (close to the Liberian border).
When the Liberian civil war re-escalated in 2002, both the Ivorian government and the rebel groups that had emerged in this area used Liberian fighters to increase their military capacity. These alliances were situational, but also built on ethnic affiliation, support and solidarity. The result was that the border between the two countries that had always been quite porous effectively became nonexistent as the two wars got tangled-up into each other. Thus, by pitting Liberians against Liberians on Ivorian soil, the situation deteriorated as ethnic cleavages from the Liberian war were recreated in Côte d'Ivoire. Liberian refugees joined the various fighting forces for different reasons. Some saw the war as an opportunity for personal enrichment, but most seem to have joined for security reasons.
For example, fighting for the government was one way of proving that they were "good strangers" who had taken up arms to defend the local Bété or Guéré communities on whose goodwill their well-being in Côte d'Ivoire depended. As such, these cross-border dynamics got caught up in land struggles as well as other economic incentives that the border area could offer such as gold, rubber and timber. Timber is still cut illegally in eastern Liberia and western Côte d'Ivoire; many former combatants and militia members are involved in artisan gold mining, and militia members and their leaders have also both taken over as well as established new rubber plantations in the border area. However, the most important economic asset is land, and particularly land suitable for cocoa production.
It is on this basis that the supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo claim to be fighting a "second war of liberation on behalf of the autochthonous populations in the western regions. This rhetoric is popular among many Bété, Gueré, and We farmers, and it is on the basis of the metanarratives that feed this rhetoric that the government's supporters build and organise their power structures. The result is an exclusionist and violent form of nationalism, without much potential for peaceful reconciliation.
Thus, what these cases underscore is that with the making of the state, land tenure became a complex cocktail of socially and politically embedded rights that were negotiated in dynamic relationships between and among different groups of people and the respective state in which they lived. What was therefore established (and still exists) is a dual land tenure system, where the governments recognised both deed ownership as well as customary users" rights. In practice what this means is that the right to land is closely tied to membership in specific groups, be they the nuclear or extended family, the larger decent group or the ethnic group, and their various relationships to modern property regimes.
Land rights are therefore often contested, always negotiable, and they change over time. The only thing that remains constant is that membership to a group and recognised "citizenship" to a geographical area is essential in these processes. Land rights issues are therefore particularly vulnerable to the politics of identity and belonging, and one important asset in such situations is the ability to stake your claim to land from the position of being autochthonous, e.g. as the "son of the soil", especially in competition with a counterpart who is presented as a "newcomer", an "immigrant", or "stranger". The result is more often than not a combination of local and nationalist discourses framed along the lines of exclusion. Inclusion -belonging and "membership" -is tied to first comer status to the soil. The end result consists of localised types of "etnonationalism", and subsequently a political climate ill-suited to the evolution of grand all-embracing nationalist discourses.
Conclusion -the End of National Identity or Tales of Origin as Political Cleavage
The question is therefore whether current developments entail the end of the grand national narratives or if new modes of nationalism will emerge from the struggles analysed in this article. What is clear is that modern liberal citizenship is, if not a failing design, at least caught up in a number of crises as populations frenetically discuss who is who -"who has citizenship but should not have it, and who should have it but does not have it" (Weber 2008: 125) . In the three main cases highlighted in this article, different narratives arguing that certain groups have certain inalienable rights seriously undermine the whole notion of national citizenship.
The situation in the Gagnoa region in Côte d'Ivoire illustrates this point. Originally, this is the homeland of the Bété, but due to the migration waves into this area described above also Ivorian Baoulé and Burkinabe Mossi groups inhabit this area today. For all practical purposes the Bété consider these two latter groups equally as foreigners. The very fact that the Baoulé carry Ivorian identification papers does not make them any more autochthonous than the Mossi. For the Bété they are both "strangers" to Gagnoa, and therefore without the same kind of inalienable rights to land as the autochthonous population. These and similar views from the case material make the whole notion of a civic national identity almost meaningless as formal citizenship is of little or no importance in local struggles over land and other assets.
What one is left with instead is a radical type of ethno-nationalism focusing on the expulsion of the "strangers" from the homeland of the autochthons. This is the situation in Lofa County, Liberia, in the south-western regions of Côte d'Ivoire and in North Kivu in the Congo. This trend is, however, also emerging in other Africa countries, although an in-depth case analysis would maybe show important variations. The Kenyan crisis, and in particular the violence in the Rift Valley, is related to historical patterns of land settlement (see Anderson and Lochery 2008) . In South Africa, another country where migrant populations have been targets of attacks by population groups considering themselves autochthonous, citizenship issues have been conceived and fought over for decades.
This debate and subsequent struggles are not new to Africa, in fact, as the article has shown, each of them have deep historical roots and connections. However, as the histories of these cases not only expose a pattern of conflict, but also co-operation, they also suggest that in the past compromises and the institutions to regulate them also existed. These cannot automatically be rediscovered and reformulated, but it is possible to imagine a less exclusivist version of both the Liberian "stranger-father" institution and the Ivorian tutorat institution. Autochthony discourses are an integral part of the "politics of recognition" (see Englund 2004) , and as they have the power to over-rule as well as underwrite other identities they can embrace as well as exclude, and promote conflict as well as reconciliation. African politicians, civic leaders and their populations at large need to realise that "tales of origin" have emerged as a political cleavage of significant importance on the African continent.
These tales have a potential for social and economic exclusion, even social death, but they can also come to represent the very building blocks of a new nationalism that integrates national, regional and local identities into a flexible modern African answer to the crisis of citizenship that has come to dominate African politics. In the case of Liberia, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire this must entail guarantees for minority protection and citizenship rights for those not considered proper citizens, but also the willingness of all concerned communities to re-negotiate land rights issues. In that regard, DRC and Côte d'Ivoire should consider following the recent example of Liberia, which has empowered its Governance Commission to establish land rights commissions on the county level. A transparent and legitimate treatment of land rights conflict would in each case constitute a possible vantage point for reconciliation locally as well as nationally.
